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INTRODUCTION
This reply addresses the thoughtful comments that former OIRA Admin-
istrator Sally Katzen has provided on our Article, Inside the Administrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control.' Our Article is
the first to investigate the agency perspective on White House involvement
in agency rule-making. We interviewed 30 of the 35 top political officials in
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") during the George H.W.
Bush ("Bush I") and the William J. Clinton Administrations during 1989-
2001.2 Prior to our study, empirical studies of White House involvement in
agency rule-making had focused almost exclusively on the White House
side, mainly analyzing White House documents and interviewing White
House officials.3 While these studies could describe how the White House
exercises control of agency rule-making, they could not speak to how agen-
cies experience such control. We began to remedy the imbalance and paint a
more complete picture of presidential control.4
By engaging our study, Katzen has added a valuable perspective to the
debate. She has also helped to confirm the value of empirical studies in this
field. Empirical studies sharpen our understanding of the relevant facts and
* Professors of Law and Co-Directors, Regulatory Program, Vanderbilt University Law
School. The authors would like to thank Tracey George and W. Kip Viscusi for helpful comments on
this reply. Smith Podris and Leon Wolfe provided valuable research assistance.
1. Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on "Inside the Admin-
istrative State," 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497 (2007).
2. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REv. 47, 63 (2006).
3. See id. at 56-61.
4. See id.
1511
Michigan Law Review
thus narrow the gaps in the theoretical debate. At the end of the day,
Katzen's claims are based only on her own experience on the White House
side and, as a result, are yet more anecdotes from that side of the executive
branch. Nonetheless, her comments are important. They confirm the need to
examine whether presidential control works from the agency side and the
need, more than ever, to get additional data that might explain why her rec-
ollections seem strikingly different from those of the top EPA presidential
appointees we interviewed for our study.
We use this brief reply to contextualize Katzen's comments about our
data. Katzen not only comes at our data from the White House side, but she
also views centralized rule-making review primarily from a practical stand-
point. In her view, such review works well to manage the bureaucracy.5
Practice is important and worth considering. But missing from that perspec-
tive, and central to our Article, is consideration of whether such review
serves the role that presidential control theorists have assigned to it of le-
gitimating agency decisionmaking and grounding agencies within our
constitutional structure.6 Missing from Katzen's account is the overarching
importance of accountability and efficacy to executive branch decision-
making. Our data suggest that there may be a problem on this front.7
I. SELECTING EPA
Katzen first suggests that our data are biased.' She contends that EPA is
not representative of other agencies and that we have used EPA data inap-
propriately to draw conclusions about a larger phenomenon-White House
oversight of all agency rule-making.9 Importantly, Katzen does not argue
that our data are biased regarding EPA in the way that empirical social sci-
entists use that term. Selection bias in the social science literature refers to
selecting a sample that is not representative of the population on a variable
of interest.'° Katzen does not dispute that our sample (30 EPA presidential
appointees subject to Senate confirmation, known as "PAS"s) is representa-
tive of the total population (35 PASs, of which 34 are living) regarding any
of the variables we studied. Thus, she essentially raises issues as to whether
EPA was a proper target for our study and whether we can draw inferences
from our data regarding other regulatory agencies.
5. See Katzen, supra note 1, at 1498 (stating that "centralized review of rule-makings is
only one piece of presidential control").
6. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 52-53.
7. See id. at 70-91.
8. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1499-1502 (asking "[ius [tihere a [b]ias in the [d]ata?" and
concluding that there is).
9. Id. at 1499 (commenting that "EPA is certainly worth studying, but it is an atypical
agency in almost every relevant respect").
10. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALI-
TATIVE RESEARCH 27-28 (1994).
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We have two responses. First, even if EPA is not representative of all
agencies, it is a sufficiently large and important regulatory agency that no
theory of presidential control can afford to ignore." Katzen acknowledges
that major rule-makings were the focus of OIRA review under the executive
orders in place during the Clinton and Bush I Administrations. 2 She also
acknowledges that EPA generated the most major rule-makings during the
Clinton Administration and was third during Bush I.3 Whether EPA was
first or third over any given period, it was-and is-clearly one of the most
important rule-making agencies in the federal government. In addition, the
total cost generated by an agency's regulations is arguably an even more
important measure of importance than the number of major rule-makings. 4
On that score, EPA dwarfs other regulatory agencies. In 1990, for example,
the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") noted that the EPA ac-
counted for roughly half ($70-$80 billion) of all direct costs on the
economy imposed by all federal regulations ($175 billion). More recently,
an OMB report estimated that between 1987 and the first quarter of 1999,
environmental regulations imposed $71 billion of the total $92 billion in
costs from all federal social regulations. '6 Environmental regulations also
provided $75-$145 of the $198-$274 billion in quantified, monetized bene-
fits. 7 Moreover, we further note that EPA has influence far beyond the
mandates of specific major rule-makings. For example, environmental regu-
lations have played a remarkable role in shaping judicial review 8 and
congressional oversight of executive branch decision-making.'9
11. In her pivotal work describing and defending increased White House involvement in
agency decision-making, Dean Elena Kagan acknowledged that President Clinton did not take an
interest in issuing regulatory directives to EPA. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2308 n.254 (2001).
12. See Katzen, supra note 1, at 1509 (acknowledging that the major or significant rule-
makings are "the most important items," and that such rule-makings were the focus of OIRA atten-
tion during the Clinton administration). Executive Order 12,866 applies to "significant" rule-
makings, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.FR. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West. Supp.
2006), and Executive Order 12,291 applies to "major" rule-makings, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). For simplicity, we use the term "major" here
to refer to both types.
13. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1500.
14. See W. Kip VIscusI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 40 (4th ed.
2005).
15. Id. at 40.
16. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 105TH CONG., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS tbl.2 (2000) [hereinafter OMB REPORT], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-report.pdf; see also Cass Sunstein, Cost-
Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1659 (2001) (noting that federal environmental
regulations imposed $130 billion in economic costs in 2000).
17. OMB REPORT, supra note 16 tbl.2.
18. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
19. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). At least 110 congressional
committees claimed jurisdiction over EPA in 1993. Only the Department of Defense ("DOD") had
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Second, EPA has strong similarities to a sizeable number of executive
branch regulatory agencies, many of which are sub-units of federal
departments. 0 Examples include the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"),
the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Marine Fisheries Service. In
the aggregate, agencies such as these generate large volumes of major and
non-major rule-makings. It is likely that the responses of the top managers
at FDA, OSHA, or other agencies will not differ a great deal from the
responses of the top managers at EPA. Like EPA, these agencies have
statutory mandates to achieve national health, safety, and environmental
goals.
Of course, EPA is not like all agencies. It is dissimilar from non-
regulatory agencies (e.g., the Department of Defense), as well as agencies
without statutory mandates regarding health, safety, and the environment
(e.g., considerable portions of the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and
Agriculture).2 ' Nevertheless, our EPA results may hold for an extremely
wide swath of the regulatory state.
Although we think it likely that our results regarding EPA are generaliz-
able to many other regulatory agencies, we do not claim that our EPA results
hold for these agencies.2 For now, we can only speak to our data, which are
solely derived from EPA. Our study demonstrates the importance of gather-
ing data in a more systematic fashion from sources on both sides of the
White House oversight process. 2' Katzen's comments help identify the types
of agencies that should be subject to future empirical studies. We are
pleased if the value of that data collection is clear. We note, however, that
our study cannot simply be dismissed or marginalized because it is the first
on the agency side or because it is the first to reveal a picture that does not
square easily with the view from the White House side.
more oversight committees, but the EPA budget was less than three percent of the DOD budget.
Leslie Kaufman, Cabinet Fever, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, July 1993, at 32, 34.
20. EPA's statutory directives also resemble in many ways those of independent agencies
such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission. These agencies have a different relationship with the White House regulatory review
process. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West.
Supp. 2006).
21. Future empirical studies will need to account for this distinction when selecting target
agencies to study and when drawing conclusions about whether to generalize their findings.
22. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 91 (noting that the picture from the EPA
side "is not conclusive; it too reflects a single perspective on a practice involving many players").
23. We contended that:
[The presidential control model] requires reworking to remain valid. Scholars can no longer
rest satisfied with generalities about political accountability, faction resistance, and regulatory
effectiveness. They must take steps to improve the presidential control model so that it better
delivers these goods in practice as well as in theory."
Id. at 99.
A Reply to Sally Katzen
Katzen also makes another claim of bias. 24 She argues that EPA officials
are biased in favor of a "parochial" interest, while OIRA officials are fo-
cused on the "national" interest.2 1 We dispute this claim at the theoretical
and practical level. First, we dispute the general characterization of EPA's
institutional interest as parochial and OIRA's interest as national. In theory,
both have national interests at stake. Both pursue the goal of maximizing
social welfare. We think it is incorrect to label as "parochial" an agency's
statutory obligation to reduce human health and environmental risks.
Second, we believe that EPA officials are no more or less likely to reflect
a bias in favor of their mission than are OIRA officials to reflect a bias in
favor of theirs. As a practical matter, the claim of bias cuts both ways. White
House staffers, whether at OIRA or any other White House office, can be-
come just as attached to the mission of their offices as agency officials.
Katzen makes no bones about her high regard for and deep appreciation of
26the career staff of OIRA. We do not doubt that the career staffers are the
dedicated civil servants she believes them to be, but they are not immune
from bias. Katzen goes out of her way to point out that both the Bush I and
Clinton PASs at EPA often "had previously been environmental activists or
state and local officials," without noting that many also came from and re-
turned to positions in corporations or corporate law firms. 7 She also does
not respond to a point that we highlighted, well expressed by the EPA re-
spondent who noted that "the civil servants in OIRA, who had been there
largely since the Reagan Administration ... were more conservative andS ,,28
suspicious of EPA regulations than the political appointees. Perhaps most
important, she does not wrestle with whether the heavy emphasis on cost-
benefit analysis and economic training at OIRA may have influenced its• • 29
performance of its mission. Her omissions do not give us confidence that
24. Katzen claims that:
[J]ust as White House officials might introduce their biases for centralized review into their
comments about the effect of their interventions in rule-makings, so too agency officials might
incorporate their biases for greater agency autonomy into their comments about relations be-
tween the White House (and/or OMB) and their agency.
Katzen, supra note 1, at 1501 (internal quotations omitted).
25. Id. at 1505 (characterizing "protecting the environment" as a "parochial" interest).
26. Id. at 1510 (stating that "I have never had the privilege of working with such an intelli-
gent, dedicated, committed, and caring professional group of people as the civil servants at OIRA").
27. Id. at 1499.
28. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 74. Katzen criticizes us for recommending
more turnover among OIRA career staff. See Katzen, supra note. 1, at 1510 (stating that "the notion
that more turnover would benefit anyone (other than those at the agencies who may not like an
informed critique of their work) is simply wrong headed"). We made this recommendation because
EPA respondents raised questions about whether the career staff had become so entrenched that they
disregarded the views of their "political bosses." See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 74.
Furthermore, staff rotation or turnover may bring in a fresh perspective that can benefit many or-
ganizations. We favor the same for EPA.
29. There is a vigorous debate in the literature regarding whether cost-benefit analysis ac-
counts adequately for the issues presented by environmental regulations, such as quantifying
environmental benefits and developing appropriate discount rates for distant costs and benefits.
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she is a more objective observer of EPA-OIRA interactions than were the
thirty respondents to our survey. The goal of studies such as ours is to make
sure that the empirical foundations on which theory is built include data
from all perspectives.
In the final analysis, we cannot sort out these issues without further em-
pirical studies. The next step is to survey the views of the PASs and top
career managers at other agencies, including agencies that resemble EPA
and those that do not. In addition, a rigorous survey of the views of the po-
litical and career staffs at the White House would be valuable.
II. DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICACY
Katzen argues that we have chosen the wrong definitions of accountabil-
ity. In her view, "transparency" and "responsiveness" really are the same,
just two "process" measures of accountability."' Because EPA offers more
process, it is therefore more accountable. 3' But, Katzen argues, we have left
out a substantive definition of accountability that requires an elected official
32to supervise agency decision-making. On that score, she continues, the
White House does better.33
Katzen has no answer, however, to the relative lack of transparency of
White House decision-making (compared to EPA decision-making), other
than to ask that we recognize that there are advantages to confidential delib-
erations.34 We recognize that there are advantages to confidentiality. Our
survey respondents worried more about the risks that arise from complex
and technical decisions being made behind closed doors, and we cannot dis-
35
agree.
Compare Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Envi-
ronmental Regulations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002), with Robert W. Hahn, The Economic
Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHi. L. REV. 1021 (2004). The EPA re-
spondents raised questions about OIRA's strong focus on quantifying and reducing costs, rather than
quantifying and increasing benefits. One respondent remarked that OIRA staffers were "single-
minded in their focus on monetizing the benefits of our rules and minimizing the costs." Bressman
& Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 74. In our study, we do not take a position on the strengths and
weaknesses of cost-benefit analysis. We note here, however, that the very issue subject to debate in
the literature is whether OIRA review is biased, as Katzen uses that term, either because cost-benefit
analysis is biased or because OIRA staffers use it in that fashion.
30. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1502.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 1503 (noting that we offered a substantive definition of political accountability,
but asserting that we did not "embrace" such a definition).
33. We note that current White House practice only meets Katzen's own definition of politi-
cal accountability if the sole relevant consideration is "product" rather than "process," and if we are
willing to replace an elected President with unelected executive branch officials. See id. (arguing
that it is the "product" rather than the "process of the decision-making, that is the key to account-
ability," and commenting that "OIRA and the White House offices all work for the president, staff
the president, and answer to the president").
34. Id. at 1508.
35. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 78, 86 (noting that 97% of EPA respon-
dents stated that White House involvement was either not visible or only somewhat visible to the
A Reply to Sally Katzen
In addition, we question whether Katzen's definition of accountability
really does any work for her. Elected officials supervise agency decision-
making in part to ensure that such decision-making is responsive to the pub-
lic. This is not the place for a grand debate over the proper definition of
accountability. Nevertheless, our data raise questions about whether White
House officials, simply by virtue of their proximity to the president, ensure
that a ency decision-making is responsive to the public than do EPA offi-
cials.
Katzen also criticizes our definitions of efficacy, which include intra-
agency coherence and inter-agency coordination. 7 We drew these definitions
from the leading proponents of OIRA review, who use concepts like reduc-
ing redundancies and avoiding unintended consequences to justify such
review." Katzen is another proponent of OIRA review, and she has more
than an academic's perspective on the practice. She tells us, from inside
OIRA, that intra-agency coordination "is not generally viewed as a goal of
centralized review, nor would it be particularly feasible given the size of the
regulatory government. ' 39 Fair enough. We are happy to drop that definition,
as our data suggest would be appropriate. ° Others should do the same.
Katzen also says that our inquiry into whether OIRA stimulates regula-
tory change is misguided.' In particular, she states that "by linking [agency
activism and regulatory efficacy], the authors are revealing a bias for regula-
tion, not for regulatory efficacy. ' 42 Stimulating regulatory change is a
measure of regulatory efficacy that we took from another important player
in the Clinton Administration-Elena Kagan, now Dean of Harvard Law
School, who served as Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Pol-
icy and Deputy Director of the Domestic Policy Council. Dean Kagan
argued that the White House may stimulate regulatory change and thereby
promote the effectiveness of regulatory decision-making.43 We agree with
Dean Kagan that the White House may have that effect. We did not find,
public and that a majority of EPA respondents believe the White House is more susceptible to fac-
tion capture than EPA).
36. Id. at 83.
37. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1506-08.
38. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical In-
vestigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 830-31 (2003) (describing OMB's capacity to coordinate
agency rule-makings); Christopher C. DeMuth and Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1075 (1986).
39. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1506.
40. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 71 ("[Mlore than 60% of respondents said
that OIRA involvement never or rarely helped to avoid inconsistencies, reduce redundancies, or
eliminate unintended consequences between or among EPA regulations.").
41. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1508.
42. Id.
43. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2353.
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however, that such activism occurred with any frequency in EPA rule-
making during the survey period.44
Furthermore, Katzen's assertion that our recommendation reveals "a bias
for regulation" on our part could not be further from the truth.45 Presidential
stimulation of regulatory change need not increase regulation. In fact, the
White House could push for regulatory change that accomplishes regulatory
ends with less regulation. Our survey and Article do not presume that the
White House will increase the number or burdens of regulations, and the
claims of bias on this point are unfounded.
Katzen claims that we have given short shrift to the data on the extent to
which OIRA promotes inter-agency coordination." On her reading, the data
more strongly support the conclusion that OIRA review works as intended
to achieve this purpose.47 We noted that the EPA respondents "frequently"
responded that OIRA helped inter-agency coordination but that the mean
score was "not overwhelming."48 We stand by our interpretation. Katzen
contends that inter-agency coordination is perhaps OIRA's central role in
regulatory review. 9 We therefore might have expected OIRA to rate highly
on this measure. In fact, the most common response to the statement that
OIRA promoted inter-agency coordination was that this was "sometimes"
true (39%), and almost 25% said it was either "never" or "rarely" true. 0 It
may be that further study will reveal a divide: the PASs of agencies with
economic development missions may rate OIRA higher on this measure
than those of agencies with environmental, health, and safety missions. But
information on that point will have to await further empirical study.
Katzen takes us to task for our analysis of OIRA's role in promoting
cost-effectiveness. 5' From our review of the literature, this is the function for
which OIRA attracts the most criticism.52 In particular, OIRA often is said to
press the cost side with less attention to the benefits side in order to slant
regulation in a deregulatory direction.53 Of course, as we noted in our Arti-
cle, there is a competing story-that OIRA prods the agency not to discount
44. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 77 ("EPA respondents provided little or no
indication that White House involvement spurred the agency to undertake new regulatory activity
and only weak indication that it spurred the agency to alter its regulatory priorities.").
45. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1508.
46. id. at 1506.
47. Id.
48. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 71-72, 74.
49. See Katzen, supra note 1, at 1505 (noting that the "substantial influence of other federal
agencies[] is key to evaluating centralized review of regulations").
50. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 72 n. 139.
51. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1507 (asserting that we "walk[ed] away" from a more neutral
interpretation of the data).
52. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006).
53. Id. at 1265.
1518 [Vol. 105:1511
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the cost side in favor of the benefits side.54 Our data cannot choose between
the two stories, but they do raise cause for concern.5 EPA respondents stated
that OIRA rarely would help them develop the benefits side and even sought
to undermine the science supporting the benefits side.56 EPA respondents
also stated that they had to spend time shoring up the cost side of their pro-
posals.57 These comments do not reflect even-handed treatment of costs and
benefits at OIRA. OIRA is a much different beast if performing a neutral
role that rationalizes and legitimates agency regulatory decision-making
rather than simply reducing regulatory costs.
Katzen believes that there is value in having agencies better defend their
58
regulatory proposals to OIRA . We agree in the abstract. As an initial mat-
ter, though, we are uncertain whether OIRA causes agencies to do "a better
job in thinking through and documenting support for their proposals," as
Katzen supposes.59 Our data are consistent with a comment made by one of
our respondents: "[Ylou had to sharpen the arguments, which mean[s] you
mustered both the scientific and the value arguments." 6 Although OIRA
undoubtedly forced more careful decision-making and more concern for
costs in many cases, in the view of many of our respondents it often caused
EPA to bolster a one-sided cost analysis rather than improve its decision-
making process overall.6' In any event, we question whether this role justi-
fies the cost and delay of OIRA review. At best, it seems like only a
marginal side-benefit.
III. THE WIZARD(S) OF OZ
Katzen asks why we "devote so much effort to trying to determine
whether it is OIRA or the White House that is the true Wizard of Oz behind
the curtain?, 62 We love this analogy, and not just because it casts us as the
affable Toto. The problem is that there is no single Wizard behind the cur-
tain. Rather, there is a cast of dozens-as many as 19 different White House
offices, and 20 including OIRA-all vying for the controls while conveying
the impression that it is the great and powerful unitary executive calling the
54. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 51-52, 76, 97 (noting competing story).
55. See Katzen, supra note 1, at 1507 (dismissing comments criticizing "OIRA's review of
the science or the risk assessment underlying the proposal or the monetization of lives saved").
56. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 94-95.
57. Id. at 77.
58. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1507.
59. Id.
60. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 77.
61. Id. ("As one respondent remarked, the EPA staff 'tended to get energized to clarify or
gain support for their position."').
62. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1503.
May 2007] 1519
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shots. 63 Katzen would have us pay no attention to that cast of dozens behind
the curtain, for they are all just the embodiment of the unitary executive.64
But consider the ramifications of that claim for the very theory on which
presidential control rests. According to its advocates, presidential control
claims power to legitimate agency action within our constitutional structure
because the president is a single actor.65 As a single actor, the president is
uniquely visible, so he may be held responsible when he directs agency ac-
tion. As a single actor, he is uniquely energetic, so he may direct agency
action with dispatch and efficiency. As a single actor, he has a national con-
stituency, so he may represent all the people when he directs agency action.
These are abstractions to be sure. But these abstractions are integral to
the legitimacy of the administrative state, as envisioned by presidential con-
trol theorists. If White House staffers influence agency action and if they do
not share the characteristics of the presidency, then they may give rise to a
multi-headed executive, which presents a problem for presidential control
theorists. That is why we devote so much time to trying to determine which
office is the source of presidential control. We are seeking to explore
whether the agencies are subject to the control of the president or merely to
the control of another set of unelected officials who may share his general
philosophies but disagree even with each other on the actual implementa-
tion.
Our data call into question the strongest claims about the unitary execu-
tive thesis. EPA respondents often did not know which official or office
spoke for the White House.6 Even during the Clinton Administration, when
OIRA had a Senate-confirmed head and an excellent one at that, EPA re-
67
spondents did not always perceive her as the woman behind the curtain.
Perhaps worse, EPA respondents often thought that the White House view
was reflected by officials other than the OIRA administrator.68 Many of these
officials have less democratic pedigree to determine regulatory policy than
do the EPA respondents. Most White House staffers are selected by the
president and serve at his pleasure. But the EPA respondents also are se-
lected by the president. In addition, the EPA respondents are subject to
Senate confirmation and are often called to testify before Congress.69 They
63. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 64 n. 107.
64. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1503-1504 ("OIRA and the White House offices all work for the
president, staff the president, and answer to the president. Thus it is almost meaningless to inquire
'who is on top' or even 'who has the ball."') (footnote omitted).
65. For these arguments, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should
Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985), and Kagan, supra note 11, at 2332-
35.
66. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 69.
67. Id. (noting that, according to EPA respondents, OIRA was frequently in the middle of
inter-agency conflict, and, according to one Clinton-era respondent, that it was "[n]ot always clear
whether OIRA was carrying other offices' water").
68. Id. at 66-68 (describing the involvement of other White House offices).
69. Although the OIRA Administrator is subject to Senate confirmation, most White House
staffers are not. In addition, although White House staffers occasionally are called to testify before
1520 [Vol. 105:1511
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are subject to Freedom of Information Ado requests, Federal Advisory
Committee Act7' requirements, and Administrative Procedure Act7 provi-
sions, including judicial review. They are less able to assert executive
privilege. In this sense, they may be more accountable than most White
House staffers.
The literature has not squarely addressed the question of who represents
the president when the president himself is not directly involved in setting
policy. Multiple staffers might claim that privilege, while offering contradic-
tory views. None possess obvious priority in the hierarchy. Indeed, Katzen
calls into question whether such a hierarchy even exists. Rather, she sug-
gests that White House and OIRA officials are "all in it together."' Yet,
when arguing that EPA is not representative of other agencies, she seeks to
distinguish EPA because there is an office in the White House dedicated to
environmental matters (the Council on Environmental Quality or "CEQ).
74
If it doesn't matter who in the White House is involved, then why does the
existence of CEQ distinguish EPA from other agencies? In any event, we are
left wondering "who is on top" and "who has the ball" within the White
House.75 The executive orders on regulatory review provide for a hierarchy
of sorts, placing the Vice President and ultimately the President at the top.
7 6
But most issues will not rise to the level of vice presidential or presidential
involvement. In that vast array of cases, who is responsible for the final de-
cision?
We are concerned about the answer to this question, and other
administrative law scholars share our concern.77 The unitary executive thesis
does not run on a slogan of "we were all in it together." Rather, it depends on
the notion, at a minimum, that the president's advisors reflect presidential
preferences, not their own preferences. We believe that the president should
Congress, the White House often vigorously resists such demands. See, e.g., Dingell, White House
at Odds Over Request For Economic Advisor to Testify on CAFE, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 29,
at A-8 (Feb. 13, 2007) (noting dispute over whether White House policy prevents president's per-
sonal staff from testifying before Congress). In contrast, EPA officials testified before Congress
ninety-eight times in 1992 alone. Kaufman, supra note 19, at 34.
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
71. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2000).
72. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2000).
73. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1504.
74. Id. at 1499-1500.
75. Id. at 1504 (stating that "it is almost meaningless to inquire 'who is on top' or even 'who
has the ball' ").
76. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,741 (Oct. 4, 1993) (providing
that "disagreements or conflicts between or among agency heads or between OMB and any agency
that cannot be resolved by the Administrator of OIRA shall be resolved by the President, or by the
Vice President acting at the request of the President").
77. One preeminent administrative law scholar, Peter Strauss, has recently expressed concern
about this issue. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.comsol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=949649 (noting that ordinary decisions are made by "one unelected opera-
tive, whose political salience is high, whose expertise is stretched and staff support limited, and
whose exposure to public view and obligations of procedural regularity are low").
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care who represents him because democracy is on the line. Thus, we believe
that the president is obligated to set up a system for ensuring that his
advisors are faithful agents. Otherwise, perhaps the ultimate decision-maker
ought to be the one to whom the statute assigns decision-making authority
or the one to whom alternative checks attach: dual-branch selection,
legislative oversight, procedural regularity, and judicial review. These
checks favor the EPA respondents. We grant that White House staffers are
closer in proximity to the president, but we are unprepared to conclude
without further information that those staffers are better positioned to
control policy outcomes on environmental matters than are the EPA
respondents.
We make this argument on normative grounds, but we also might frame
it in positive political terms. Political scientists have recognized for some
time that the president must address the risk that staffers might impose their
own preferences. The president confronts an almost overwhelming task of
monitoring his advisors to avoid this principal-agent problem. This man-
agement task has grown as the White House seeks to control more and more
regulatory matters, and the president is able to clear fewer and fewer. Politi-
cal scientists have shown that some presidents have managed the White
House staff better than others.79 But no political scientist has made the ex-
traordinary claim that Katzen seems to be making: Because the president
cannot decide every major issue, he should be indifferent to which of his
advisors does decide.80 From a positive political perspective, the president
should care whether his agents reflect his preferences because his legacy is
on the line.
In sum, we believe that it matters who behind the curtain is pulling the
levers. Katzen was satisfied that the collective adequately represented the
Wizard because they were part of the same team." But when reasonable
minds within that team might radically disagree on a particular policy
judgment, we are unprepared to conclude without further information that
EPA presidential appointees are less reflective of presidential preferences on
environmental issues than any other official.
IV. SELECTIVITY OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT
Katzen believes that we are wrong to criticize White House or OIRA in-
volvement in rule-making as overly selective in its focus. As she writes,
78. See, e.g., Samuel Kemell, The Evolution of the White House Staff, in CAN THE GOVERN-
MENT GOVERN 185 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989); Karen M. Hult, Advising the
President, in RESEARCHING THE PRESIDENCY Ill (George C. Edwards, John H. Kessel & Bert A.
Rockman eds., 1993); Terry M. Moe, Presidents, Institutions and Theory, in RESEARCHING THE
PRESIDENCY, supra at 337.
79. See Kemell, supra note 78, at 189-92 (describing different administrations).
80. See Katzen, supra note 1, at 1504 (arguing that it is "meaningless" to worry about who
among the many White House officials is actually making the final decision because such officials
are "all in it together," even if they do not agree with one another.).
81. Seeid. at 1503-04.
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"selectivity is an important and effective management tool-if you looked
over everything, you might well lose the forest for the trees.' ' 2 She describes
us as saying that "unless the selection criteria are publicly articulated or oth-
erwise discernable to everyone-apparently not only those in the agencies
but also those in the media and those in the academy-then it is a deficient
filter or 'model.' ,83
From an internal management perspective, maximum flexibility often
seems like the better move. The White House and OIRA remain free to
choose which proposals they will scrutinize, and at what level of intensity.
But the question is whether democracy demands a better understanding of
how government works. If proponents of the strong president model wish to
legitimate agency decisions, then we might expect to know which decisions.
Furthermore, we might demand reassurance that such decisions are selected
on the basis of some public-regarding criteria rather than the personal pro-
clivities of individual officials. 84
Katzen suggests that the success of any model depends on how well the
political leadership uses it.81 We certainly agree. Our point, however, is that
on complex regulatory matters, the public lacks any way to evaluate how
well the political leadership uses the model unless they explain the basis for
their decisions. We are not alone in this demand. Other scholars have rec-
ommended more transparency from the White House.s6 And Administrator
John D. Graham, in the George W. Bush Administration, took some action
on that front, putting in place measures to help the public better evaluate
OIRA involvement in particular rule-makings-and some of those measures
built on the innovations that Katzen herself put in place.
7
Our point goes one further. We seek more information from the White
House not only about the extent of its involvement in particular rule-
makings, but also about its process for determining in which rule-makings
82. Id. at 1509.
83. Id.
84. See Strauss, supra note 77, at 39 (characterizing White House involvement in agency
decision-making as "the product of a politically driven accident making this one issue salient, out of
the thousands that remain unattended-a bolt of lightening hurled by an unelected operative").
85. Katzen, supra note 1, at 1509.
86. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 38, at 879 (acknowledging room for improvement in OIRA
review, particularly as to transparency); Kagan, supra note 11, at 2337 (advocating greater transpar-
ency for White House involvement in agency decision-making).
87. See John D. Graham, Memorandum for OIRA Staff (Oct. 18, 2001), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira-disclosurememo-b.html (stating that "the transparency of
the OIRA's regulatory review process is critical" and describing steps to make available draft regula-
tions, agency analyses, other material submitted by the agency, change pages, correspondence
between OIRA and the agency, and correspondence between OIRA and outside parties); Testimony
of Sally Katzen, Adjunct Professor and Public Interest/Public Service Fellow, University of Michi-
gan Law School before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law on Feb. 13, 2007, http://judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.aspxID=726
(noting that Executive Order 12,866, of which she was a principal architect, improved the transpar-
ency of the OIRA review process).
1523May 20071
Michigan Law Review
to get involved."' We do not recommend that the White House or OIRA re-
veal every aspect of their management process. Rather, we ask for more
transparency and more regularity. 9 We recognize and respect the counter-
vailing pull for flexibility. In the end, we believe that the White House and
OIRA could do a better job without sacrificing the maneuvering room nec-
essary to effective management.
CONCLUSION
We are fortified by the interest that our Article has generated in empiri-
cal study of White House involvement in agency rule-making. We are
certain now that the debate has finally been joined. Our data show a picture
of White House involvement from the agency side. Perhaps it is not surpris-
ing that the agency picture is more complex and less positive than the White
House picture. What that tells us is not that the data are biased but rather
that we are coming closer to seeing how this important practice works in
reality, not just in theory or in the views of a select few. Only when we see
clearly how White House involvement in agency rule-making does work
may we think sensibly about how it should work.
Authors' Note: We encourage Professor Katzen to publish a surrebuttal, as
we would like to see this debate continue.
88. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 91-95.
89. Id.
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